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In Korematsu, Hirabayashi, and the Second Monster,1 Eric L. Muller
explores whether Korematsu v. United States2 is dead post-Trump v. Hawaii,3
and whether by failing to strike down Hirabayashi v. United States,4 the
“mother”5 of Korematsu and a “second monster”6 lives on. This brief
response Essay contends that answering these questions first demands
grasping how Trump v. Hawaii failed to fully address the program
implemented by the Muslim Ban–Travel Ban: Extreme Vetting. Extreme
Vetting can be characterized as a form of “digital internment” through a
complex web of cybersurveillance, administrative-imposed restraints, and
“identity-management” rationales that are referenced in the text of the

† .Associate Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University School of Law. This research
benefited greatly from the discussions generated at the Immigration Theory Workshop, hosted by
Daniel Morales and the University of Houston Law Center, and the Constitutional Law Schmooze,
hosted by Mark Graber and the University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law. Many
thanks for the excellent research assistance of Sean Moran, Kaya Vyas, Jake Walker, and Matt
Wyatt. All mistakes and omissions are my own.
1. Eric L. Muller, Korematsu, Hirabayashi, and the Second Monster, 98 TEXAS L. REV. 735
(2020).
2. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
3. 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018).
4. 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
5. Muller, supra note 1, at 736.
6. Id. at 749.
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Muslim Ban–Travel Ban Proclamation(s).7 This Essay concludes that coming
to grips with whether Korematsu was resurrected by Trump v. Hawaii, and
exactly how the reasoning of Hirabayashi remains a vibrant threat, depends
upon confronting the full discriminatory impact of Extreme Vetting.
Trump v. Hawaii, decided in June 2018, upheld the Trump
Administration’s efforts to deny citizens of seven predominantly majorityMuslim nations visas to the U.S.8 In a dissenting opinion, Justice Sotomayor
invoked Korematsu: “Today’s holding [in Trump v. Hawaii] is all the more
troubling given the stark parallels between the reasoning of this case and that
of Korematsu v. United States.”9 Chief Justice Roberts denied that any
parallel exists: “Whatever rhetorical advantage the dissent may see in doing
so, Korematsu has nothing to do with this case. The forcible relocation of
U.S. citizens to concentration camps, solely and explicitly on the basis of
race, is objectively unlawful and outside the scope of Presidential
authority.”10 Chief Justice Roberts reasoned that suspending foreigner entry
into the U.S. through denial of an immigration visa document “is an act that
is well within executive authority . . . .”11 The majority opinion then
announced that Korematsu was overruled: “The dissent’s reference to
Korematsu, however, affords this Court the opportunity to make express what
is already obvious: Korematsu was gravely wrong the day it was decided, has
been overruled in the court of history, and—to be clear—‘has no place in law
under the Constitution.’”12
Muller’s thoughtful analysis advances important claims. He first
defends the position that Korematsu was explicitly overruled in Trump v.
Hawaii.13 He challenges those who argue that “Korematsu did not really die,
but just shape-shifted” into Trump v. Hawaii.14 In both Korematsu and Trump
v. Hawaii, Muller agrees that insufficient evidence supports the national
security justification for the executive action.15 Muller observes, however,
that many national security cases lack conclusive or compelling evidence.16
7. Proclamation No. 9983, 85 Fed. Reg. 6699 (Jan. 31, 2020). For a fuller discussion on the
concept and policy application of “identity management” in author’s other work, see Margaret Hu,
Algorithmic Jim Crow, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 633, 636 (2017); Margaret Hu, Biometric
Cyberintelligence and the Posse Comitatus Act, 66 EMORY L.J. 697, 724 (2017); Margaret Hu,
Crimmigration-Counterterrorism, 2017 WIS. L. REV. 955, 973.
8. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2423.
9. Id. at 2447 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
10. Id. at 2423.
11. Id.
12. Id. (quoting Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 248 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting)).
13. Muller, supra note 1, at 743.
14. Id. Muller cites to multiple scholars and experts to establish this argument. Id. at 743 n.69.
15. See id. at 746–47.
16. Id.
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By dismissing Korematsu in a highly conclusory manner, the Supreme Court
failed to explain exactly why Korematsu should be overruled.17 According to
Muller, Korematsu’s most grievous error was failing to properly apply strict
scrutiny to the race-based classification of those targeted for internment.18
Muller argues that Korematsu was both overinclusive (mass forced relocation
of 112,000 Japanese residing in the U.S. during WWII, of which an estimated
66% were U.S. citizens) and underinclusive (“leaving American citizens of
German and Italian ancestry untouched”).19 Muller explains that by failing to
offer this clarification, the Court missed an important opportunity to rectify
the wrongs of Korematsu. “The Court’s crucial error in Korematsu was to
tolerate racial line-drawing where it should have been—and pretended to
be—demanding. The error was promising to test racial action in the name of
national security with vigor and then doing it with indulgence.”20
After concluding the “first monster”—Korematsu—is “slain,”21 Muller
trains his scholarly lens on a “second,” “new monster”22—Hirabayashi.
Muller posits: “Still alive and on the prowl, Hirabayashi can do real
damage.”23 Hirabayashi, decided in 1943, the year prior to Korematsu,
upheld the constitutionality of a military-imposed, dusk-to-dawn curfew that
had been imposed on all Japanese, citizens and noncitizens, residing on the
West Coast.24 The curfew was implemented pursuant to Executive Order
9066, the same Executive Order relied upon to support the executive action
of Japanese internment.25 Muller states that, “[u]nlike Korematsu, which by
the 1980s had become a case that no judge would mention in polite company,
Hirabayashi has retained a modicum of vitality as precedent.”26 Muller
carefully catalogues how the case has been relied upon for the proposition
that the Executive is owed a high level of deference on national security factfinding matters.27
What if Muller is correct in his analysis, however, and we still end up
with a racist national security policy? Muller argues that Korematsu was
overinclusive and underinclusive, and that the Court, in upholding the
internment, failed to apply strict scrutiny to a race-based classification
program. Yet, both Hirabayshi and Korematsu allowed for racist policy to

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Id.
Id. at 747–48.
Id. at 751, 755.
Id. at 749.
Id. at 743.
Id. at 749.
Id. at 753.
Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 88, 104 (1943).
Muller, supra note 1, at 736, 749.
Id. at 752.
Id. at 752–53.
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masquerade as a national security program. In other words, Muller is correct
that strict scrutiny should provide the type of test that prevents the racism that
led to the Court’s findings in Hirabayashi and Korematsu. The problem is
that national security deference may preclude the application of strict
scrutiny, never allowing for an inquiry into the suspect classification in the
first instance.
Even if the Court had applied the highest level of scrutiny in Korematsu,
a searching inquiry into the underinclusiveness or overinclusiveness of the
race-based classification would have still led to mass internment and
indefinite detention. If the Court had determined that the race-based
classification was underinclusive, would the federal government have
expanded mass internment to U.S. citizens of German and Italian ancestry?
If the Court had determined that the race-based classification was
overinclusive, would the federal government engage in the types of “enemy
combatant” and “unlawful combatant” classifications and military tribunals
that led the Court to question whether due process and habeas corpus rights
had been violated in post-9/11 decisions such as Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,28
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,29 and Boumediene v. Bush?30
Because of the national security framing of the issue, the Court in Trump
v. Hawaii focused on the wrong question. It asked whether the President can
take necessary action to defend the nation by preventing foreigner entry into
the United States. The Court in Korematsu also answered the wrong question.
It asked whether the military could take necessary action to defend the nation
by preventing sabotage through the containment of potential enemy
sympathizers and spies through mass evacuation. In Korematsu, the real
question was whether the animating force behind this drastic measure was
truly one of national security. Like internment, the real question in Trump v.
Hawaii was whether the executive action was based upon prejudice and
xenophobia, economic populism and protectionism, and white nationalism.
Justice Murphy’s dissent in Korematsu explains:
Special interest groups were extremely active in applying pressure for
mass evacuation. See House Report No. 2124 (77th Cong., 2d Sess.)
154–6; McWilliams, Prejudice, 126–8 (1944). Mr. Austin E. Anson,

28. 542 U.S. 507, 509, 538 (2004) (holding that a U.S. citizen with “enemy combatant”
designation cannot be indefinitely detained without due process as guaranteed by the Fifth
Amendment and recognizing right to petition detention under habeas corpus).
29. 548 U.S. 557, 567 (2006) (concluding that the military commission established to review
conspiracy charge against a noncitizen “enemy combatant” violated the Uniform Code of Military
Justice and Geneva Conventions, as it failed to allow the detainee to hear and contest adversarial
evidence).
30. 553 U.S. 723, 732–33 (2008) (holding that “enemy combatant” designation or detention in
Guantanamo outside of U.S. territory does not preclude habeas corpus petition right, and Military
Commission Act cannot be read to suspend writ of habeas corpus).
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managing secretary of the Salinas Vegetable Grower-Shipper
Association, has frankly admitted that “We’re charged with wanting
to get rid of the Japs for selfish reasons. . . . We do. It’s a question of
whether the white man lives on the Pacific Coast or the brown men.
They came into this valley to work, and they stayed to take over. . . .
They undersell the white man in the markets. . . . They work their
women and children while the white farmer has to pay wages for his
help. If all the Japs were removed tomorrow, we’d never miss them in
two weeks, because the white farmers can take over and produce
everything the Jap grows. And we don’t want them back when the war
ends, either.” Quoted by Taylor in his article “The People Nobody
Wants,” 214 Sat. Eve. Post 24, 66 (May 9, 1942).31
It is imperative for the Court, therefore, to assess whether the national
security justification is pretext. If compelling evidence is not offered in
support of executive action, deference to national security rationales should
not be at its height. Confronting the question of race-based or religion-based
discrimination is of critical importance. In the fog of war and in the face of
executive insistence of facially neutral policies, is it realistic that the evidence
would exist to sufficiently establish it? Historically, discrimination questions
have not been fully confronted when the Executive invokes a national
security objective. Just like in Hirabayashi and Korematsu, the question of
discrimination in Trump v. Hawaii was disposed of as a distraction.32 But, as
the overruling of Korematsu in the “court of history” makes clear, those same
concerns were the basis of striking down Korematsu with the benefit of
several decades of hindsight. Is there a way to allow for national security
jurisprudence to come to grips with discrimination without waiting threequarters of a century for an admission that a gross injustice had occurred?
Similarly, is it possible that explicitly striking down Hirabayashi in the
future may prove to be an empty action? After all, Justice Sotomayor
observed that expressly overruling Korematsu is meaningless if the Court is
31. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 239 n.12 (1944) (Murphy, J., dissenting).
32. See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2420–21 (2018); Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 223;
Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 98–99 (1943). See also ERIC K. YAMAMOTO, IN THE
SHADOW OF KOREMATSU (2018); Lorraine K. Bannai, Korematsu Overruled? Far from It: The
Supreme Court Reloads the Loaded Weapon, 16 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 897 (2018); Robert S.
Chang, Whitewashing Precedent: From the Chinese Exclusion Case to Korematsu to the Muslim
Travel Ban Cases, 68 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1183 (2018); Mark Tushnet, Trump v. Hawaii:“This
President” and the National Security Constitution, 2018 SUP. CT. REV. 1; Khaled A. Beydoun, The
Korematsu Moment for Muslim Americans, AL JAZEERA (June 28, 2018), https://
www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/korematsu-moment-muslim-americans180628093048161.html [https://perma.cc/RB4H-X7FN]; Harold Hongju Koh, Symposium: Trump
v. Hawaii—Korematsu’s Ghost and National-Security Masquerades, SCOTUSBLOG (June 28,
2018, 11:00 AM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2018/06/symposium-trump-v-hawaii-korematsusghost-and-national-security-masquerades/ [https://perma.cc/KP8Z-5UWM].
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willing to deploy the same logic and national security deference without
sufficient evidence.33 What if the racism that animated Executive Order 9066
in 1942 and its implementation is the same racism that animates the Muslim
Ban–Travel Ban and Extreme Vetting? What would a mass internment
program look like in the twenty-first century, where twenty-four hour
surveillance of racial or religious groups is possible without the need to
physically intern those surveilled in camps? Erin Murphy asks: with
technological innovation, are “paradigms of restraint” switching from
physical restraint (prison) to virtual forms of restraint (surveillance)? 34 Under
new “paradigms of restraint,” how would the Court review “digital
internment” or mass surveillance under Extreme Vetting?
Then-presidential candidate Donald J. Trump first announced the
“Muslim Ban” from the campaign trail in 2015. He later elaborated that it
was synonymous with “Extreme Vetting.” Specifically, by October 9, 2016,
at the second presidential debate in St. Louis, Missouri, he explained: “The
Muslim ban is something that in some form has morphed into a(n) extreme
vetting from certain areas of the world.”35 In several media revelations and
other Department of Homeland Security (DHS) disclosures—including DHS
Federal Register Notices,36 DHS Privacy Impact Assessments,37 DHS

33. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2448 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
34. Erin Murphy, Paradigms of Restraint, 57 DUKE L.J. 1321, 1325–27 (2008).
35. Alan Gomez, What President Trump Has Said About the Travel Ban, USA TODAY (June
11, 2017, 10:42 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2017/06/11/what-presidenttrump-has-said-about-muslims-travel-ban/102565166/ [https://perma.cc/7FS8-EZE5].
36. See, e.g., FAIZA PATEL, RACHEL LEVINSON-WALDMAN, SOPHIA DENUYL, & RAYA
KOREH, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, SOCIAL MEDIA MONITORING 11, 13 (2019); Margaret Hu,
The Ironic Privacy Act, 96 WASH. U. L. REV. 1267, 1272 n.14 (2019) (citing multiple federal
register notices announcing the expansion of social media data collection as part of immigration and
vetting procedures: Privacy Act of 1974; System of Records, 82 Fed. Reg. 43,556 (Dep’t of
Homeland Sec. Sept. 18, 2017); Privacy Act of 1974; DHS/CBP-024 Intelligence Records System
(CIRS) System of Records, 82 Fed. Reg. 44,198 (Sept. 21, 2017); 60-Day Notice of Proposed
Information Collection: Application for Immigrant Visa and Alien Registration, 83 Fed. Reg.
13,806 (Dep’t of State Mar. 30, 2018)); and 60-Day Notice of Proposed Information Collection:
Application for Nonimmigrant Visa, 83 Fed. Reg. 13,807 (Dep’t of State Mar. 30, 2018)).
37. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT UPDATE FOR THE
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR INTELLIGENCE (AFI) DHS/CBP/PIA-010(a) 1–4 (Sept. 1, 2016,
appendix updated Mar. 2020), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/privacy-piacbp-afi-march2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/2KAN-SN4W].
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contracts and solicitations,38 and testimony by DHS officials39—it appears
that the Muslim Ban–Travel Ban has evolved and continues to evolve into a
complex cybersurveillance program.40 Although DHS denies that Extreme
Vetting is an algorithmic-based screening/database-driven vetting system,41
other evidence appears to call these denials into question.42
Operationally, the presidential proclamations authorizing the Muslim
Ban–Travel Ban are a bit of a blank check, much like Executive Order 9066.
Once Executive Order 9066 was in place, it allowed for myriad
discriminatory executive actions to flow from it—from curfews43 and theft
of property44 to mass internment and indefinite detention without due
process.45 In this way, Trump v. Hawaii should be viewed as a precursor case,
much like Hirabayashi. Hirabayashi’s precedent was subsequently expanded
in Korematsu to justify the constitutionality of mass evacuation and
relocation. In other words, the Court focused its attention in Trump v. Hawaii
on the Executive’s authority to police the nation’s border through its
immigration policy.46 The Court did not answer in Trump v. Hawaii whether
the apparatus of Extreme Vetting, a cybersurveillance regime that impacts
U.S. citizens and noncitizens alike,47 is constitutional or within the scope of

38. DHS granted Palantir a $41 million contract in 2014 to build ICM, a “vast ‘ecosystem’ of
data” to assist ICE agents in discovering potential deportation cases through access to multiple
intelligence databases managed by several agencies. Spencer Woodman, Palantir Provides the
Engine for Donald Trump’s Deportation Machine, INTERCEPT (Mar. 2, 2017, 12:18 PM),
https://theintercept.com/2017/03/02/palantir-provides-the-engine-for-donald-trumps-deportationmachine/ [https://perma.cc/ZJ7C-7Q5Y].
39. Ending the Crisis: America’s Borders and the Path to Security: Hearing Before the H.
Comm. on Homeland Sec., 115th Cong. 83 (2017) (statement of John F. Kelly, DHS Secretary).
40. See Hu, supra note 36, at 1292. See also Hu, Algorithmic Jim Crow, supra note 7, at 635;
Hu, Crimmigration-Counterterrorimsm, supra note 7, at 962.
41. Drew Harwell & Nick Miroff, ICE Just Abandoned its Dream of ‘Extreme Vetting’ Software
that Could Predict Whether a Foreign Visitor Would Become a Terrorist, WASH. POST (May 17,
2018, 12:33 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2018/05/17/ice-justabandoned-its-dream-of-extreme-vetting-software-that-could-predict-whether-a-foreign-visitorwould-become-a-terrorist/ [https://perma.cc/X8BE-6Y3B].
42. Id.; see also Hu, supra note 36, at 1300.
43. See Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 101–02 (1943) (holding that the
implementation of a curfew against all persons of Japanese ancestry was within the constitutional
authority of Congress and the President).
44. COMM’N ON WARTIME RELOCATION AND INTERNMENT OF CIVILIANS, PERSONAL JUSTICE
DENIED PART 2: RECOMMENDATIONS 5 (1983), https://www.archives.gov/files/research/japaneseamericans/justice-denied/part-2-recommendations.pdf [https://perma.cc/2P6M-TEM4] (adjusted
for inflation, the Commission concluded the “total losses of income and property fall between $810
million and $2 billion in 1983 dollars.”).
45. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 219 (1944).
46. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2403 (2018).
47. See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2420–22.
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presidential authority. This allows Trump v. Hawaii to reach its conclusion
without interrogating the full impact of the overarching program.48
In the meantime, the ever-widening reach of Extreme Vetting continues
to extend, and communities of color targeted for disfavor are especially hard
hit. On January 31, 2020, the Trump White House added six new nations to
the Muslim Ban–Travel Ban through presidential proclamation, justifying the
expansion:
[B]ecause each of the six additional countries identified in the January
2020 proposal has deficiencies in sharing terrorist, criminal, or
identity information, there is an unacceptable likelihood that
information reflecting the fact that a visa applicant is a threat to
national security or public safety may not be available at the time the
visa or entry is approved.49
For each of the six countries—Burma, Eritrea, Kyrgyzstan, Nigeria, Sudan,
and Tanzania—the proclamation states that although the degrees of
compliance might vary, each country was added in part because the country
“does not comply with the established identity-management and informationsharing criteria assessed by the performance metrics.”50 An estimated 320
million Muslims globally are now affected by the Muslim Ban–Travel Ban,
including 25% of all Africans.51 The “identity-management” and
“information-sharing” rationales allow the federal government to execute
many “facially neutral” objectives through technological means within a
highly bureaucratized structure where the discrimination is obscured. 52
In the event of another terrorist attack, Muller warns that Hirabayashi
could be used to justify a range of discriminatory executive actions. The
parade of horribles could include: “an array of race- or religion-based
government intrusions and impositions that are an order of magnitude milder
than mass exclusion. Mass surveillance; mass registration; mandatory
48. Several cases challenging aspects of the Extreme Vetting are in active litigation. See, e.g.,
Wagafe v. Trump, No. C17-0094-RAJ, 2017 WL 2671254, at *1–2 (W.D. Wash. June 21, 2017);
Complaint at 9–16, Doc Soc’y v. Pompeo, No. 19-3632 (D.D.C. Dec. 5, 2019). See also HARSHA
PANDURANGA, ET AL., BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, EXTREME VETTING AND THE MUSLIM BAN
12, 21 (2017); Hu, Algorithmic Jim Crow, supra note 7, at 637; Peter Margulies, Bans, Borders,
And Sovereignty: Judicial Review of Immigration Law in the Trump Administration, 2018 MICH.
ST. L. REV. 1, 79; Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, National Security, Immigration and the Muslim Bans,
75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1475, 1481 (2018), for fuller discussions on the various legal and
interpretive issues arising from the Muslim Ban–Travel Ban and Extreme Vetting.
49. Proclamation No. 9983, 85 Fed. Reg. 6699, 6702 (Jan. 31, 2020).
50. Id. at 6703–05.
51. Sam Levin, ‘Trump is Deciding Who is American’: How the New Travel Ban is Tearing
Families
Apart,
GUARDIAN
(Feb.
16,
2020),
https://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2020/feb/16/trump-is-deciding-who-is-american-how-the-new-travel-ban-is-tearingfamilies-apart [https://perma.cc/4GWD-MNW9].
52. Hu, Algorithmic Jim Crow, supra note 7, at 673.
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identity cards; mass federal job layoffs; mass loyalty inquests . . . .”53 He
cautions that these programs may “have a potential constitutional pedigree in
a world where Korematsu is dead but its mother, Hirabayashi, survives.”54
Muller argues forcefully that Hirabayashi, Korematsu’s progenitor, must be
explicitly overruled. What if, however, the cybersurveillance apparatus of
Extreme Vetting, combined with the highly complex and opaque
administrative structure under which the Muslim Ban–Travel Ban is
executed, ensures that we have already started the process of implementing
complex forms of “mass surveillance,” “mass registration,” “mandatory
identity cards,” and “mass loyalty inquests” under the umbrella of the Muslim
Ban–Travel Ban?
After the national shame of Korematsu, it is unlikely that the federal
government would implement mass internment in the exact same manner as
it did in 1942. Yet, how would a “national surveillance state,”55 with the most
sophisticated cybersurveillance tools at its disposal, animate similar
objectives to those embodied by Executive Order 9066? The long and
shameful shadows cast by Hirabayashi and Korematsu will continue to haunt
Trump v. Hawaii. In Professor Muller’s excellent essay, he argues that
Hirabayshi must be explicitly overruled alongside Korematsu.56 He contends
that Hirabayshi allows for the government to justify a wide range of
potentially discriminatory initiatives under the justification of national
security.57 Unfortunately, the wide range of discriminatory actions may
already be taking place, even with the overruling of Korematsu in Trump v.
Hawaii, and even if Hirabayashi is overruled in the future.
Are there critical distinctions between the mass internment of
Korematsu and the mass surveillance of Extreme Vetting? Yes. But the
national security pretext is the same. Justice Sotomayor stated: “Today, the
Court takes the important step of finally overruling Korematsu . . . .”58 She
explained:
This formal repudiation of a shameful precedent is laudable and long
overdue. But it does not make the majority’s decision here acceptable
53. Muller, supra note 1, at 754.
54. Id.
55. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, The Constitution in the National Surveillance State, 93 MINN. L.
REV. 1, 12 (2008); Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Processes of Constitutional Change:
From Partisan Entrenchment to the National Surveillance State, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 489, 520–
21 (2006) (characterizing the “National Surveillance State” as representing “a significant increase
in government investments in technology and government bureaucracies devoted to promoting
domestic security and (as its name implies) gathering intelligence and surveillance using all of the
devices that the digital revolution allows”).
56. Muller, supra note 1, at 755.
57. Id. at 753.
58. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2448 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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or right. By blindly accepting the Government’s misguided invitation
to sanction a discriminatory policy motivated by animosity toward a
disfavored group, all in the name of a superficial claim of national
security, the Court redeploys the same dangerous logic underlying
Korematsu and merely replaces one “gravely wrong” decision with
another.59
The Court’s recent disavowal of Korematsu, although unelaborated, implies
recognition that the mass detention of the Japanese Americans and those U.S.
residents of Japanese ancestry had been driven by racial animus based upon
the verdict of history. We now need a test that is not dependent upon the
verdict of history.

59. Id.

